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Introduction 
The U.S. steel industry seems perennially 
afflicted with overcapacity Even after numerous 
plant closings, and despite recent high capacity- 
utilization rates, analysts suggest that another 15 
to 20 percent of current capacity should close. 
Why has overcapacity been a chronic ailment 
of steel firms during the 1970s and 1980s?  Why 
haven't firms closed plants more quickly since 
continued operation of these plants depresses 
profits for the entire industry? 
The persistent survival of excess capacity is 
not inexplicable. In theory, a market system 
reallocates resources from activities yielding 
lower-than-normal returns to activities with 
higher returns. In practice, however, firms can 
be locked into a low-profit activity if  large losses 
are incurred when capital is transferred to new 
activities. These potential losses form an exit 
barrier, delaying plant closings, depressing prof- 
its, and prolonging  adjustment for the entire 
industry1 
1  The term "exit barrier" is perhaps unfortunate, as it carries the 
connotations of inefficiency attached to the phrase "entry barrier." Such 
is not the case: exit barriers are the various cost conditions that make 
lengthy exit a rational response by firms. 
The primary purpose of  this paper is to 
examine the nature and size of exit barriers in 
the steel industry First, the necessity for contrac- 
tion in this industry is summarized. Then basic 
exit theory is reviewed, and several types of exit 
barriers that seem most pertinent to the steel 
industry are described. The potential size of 
these barriers in the steel industry is assessed. 
Finally, the possible effects of current trade- 
protection and pension-insurance  policies on 
the size of exit barriers in the steel industry are 
discussed. 
This paper argues that high exit barriers have 
significantly slowed the industry's contraction 
by delaying plant closings. These barriers 
explain why capacity has fallen slowly even 
though industry profits have been subnormal 
since the late 1950s. They also help to explain 
why the industry failed to modernize some 
plants, even though these increasingly ineffi- 
cient plants continued to operate into the 1980s. 
I.  The Necessity for 
Contraction 
The U.S. steel industry has performed poorly 
during the last 25 years. Profits for the industry 
have been low compared to the average man- 
ufacturing return in virtually every year since 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/review/
1988 Q 1
Best available copy195EL2 And despite the industry's recent buoy- 
ant performance-part of  which appears to be 
due to trade protection-long-run trends in steel 
demand and steel supply point to continued low 
profits in the future. 
Structural changes in steel demand have 
greatly reduced the growth of the market. These 
changes, which include increased use of steel 
substitutes such as aluminum and plastic, and 
reductions in the amount of steel used in con- 
sumer durables, particularly cars, have reduced 
the U.S. economy's need for steel. The average 
annual growth rate of  U.S. apparent steel con- 
sumption has fallen from from 4.1 percent dur- 
ing 1960-1969,  to 1.9 percent during 1970-1979, 
to 0.2 percent during 1980-1986. 
Not all steel firms have fared the same, how- 
ever. The industry basically consists of  two parts: 
integrated mills and minimills. The integrated 
mills, which produce steel from iron ore, are the 
traditional steel industry, while the minimills, 
which produce steel products by recycling steel 
scrap, are relative newcomers. It is the integrated 
portion of the industry that has performed so 
poorly; minimills have flourished, increasing 
their market share from about 3 percent in 1960 
to 18 percent in 1985. 
As  their name suggests, minimills produce 
steel on a much smaller scale than integrated 
plants, reducing the size of the required capital 
commitment considerably3 The mills also ben- 
efit from employing workers at lower wages. 
Though their costs are extremely sensitive to 
the price of scrap, minimills have become very 
competitive in the product lines in which they 
specialize, drastically reducing the integrated 
mills' sales in these markets4 
In addition, integrated firms in the U.S. faced 
tough new competition from imports for a share 
of the market, as fundamental changes in input 
costs during the 1950s and 1960s altered the 
comparative advantage in steelmaking. Two 
studies, by Crandall(1981)  and by Kawahito 
(1972),  examine the changes in the relative cost 
H 2 See Crandall(1981), p.  29, for the rate of  return on equity after 
taxes in steel versus all U.S. manufacturing for the years1954-1978. 
See U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Quarterly 
Financial  Reports for Manufacturing Corporations, various issues, for 
subsequent years. 
H 3-Minimills typically consist of an electric steel furnace, a continu 
ous billet caster, and some kind of  finishing mill, usually for bars. See 
Miller (1984)for a good description of this technology. 
H 4 Minimills have a cost advantage over all integrated mills, whether 
domestic or foreign, in the products they can produce. See Barnett and 
Crandall(1986)  for a detailed comparison of  minimill to integrated mill 
production costs. 
of  materials in the U.S. compared to other 
countries, particularly Japan. Formerly, abundant 
supplies of coal and iron ore assured U.S. pro- 
ducers of a materials cost advantage that, along 
with greater U.S. productivity, more than com- 
pensated for higher U.S. wage rates. However, 
the discovery of  rich iron-ore sources in several 
parts of  the world and the decreased cost of 
ocean shipping began to reduce the traditional 
U. S. advantage. 
Also, as Barnett and Schorsch (1983) point 
out, countries like Japan experienced phe- 
nomenal growth in steel consumption after 
World War  11. Their steel industries were able to 
build entirely new, large-scale plants, since their 
rapidly expanding markets could easily absorb 
the output of  the additional capacity These new 
plants incorporated the latest technology into an 
optimal plant layout, resulting in high productiv- 
ity growth. Increased productivity growth, 
combined with lower wage rates, reduced the 
unit cost of labor further below U.S. levels. This 
advantage, added to the favorable changes in 
materials costs, made foreign steel very com- 
petitive with U.S. integrated production.5 
The result has been a decline in the market 
share of integrated steel firms in the U.S. from 
more than 90 percent in 1960 to less than 65 
percent in the 1980s. Given the slow growth of 
the market, these figures translated into a need 
to cut integrated steel capacity by closing plants. 
And, in fact, the industry has closed plants. 
From its height in the early 1970s of approx- 
imately 155 million tons, annual raw steel capac- 
ity has fallen to about 112  million tons. 
But the contraction of the industry has taken 
a long time, even though capital has been earn- 
ing subnormal profits for many years6 Rather 
than moving into other activities, firms appear 
to be clinging tenaciously to capacity by nursing 
along aging plants, as if  the growth in demand 
for steel might miraculously increase to pre-1970 
levels. But as the discussion in the next section 
shows,  this  response may  well be optimal for 
firms facing high exit barriers. 
H 5 In fact, Crandall(1981)  concludes that a totally new integrated plant 
would be a poor investment in the United States, given his estimates of 
the possible reductions in labor and energy savings attainable. 
H 6 The first major plant closings, those of  Youngstown Sheet & Tube 
and the United States Steel Corporation at Youngstown, did not occur 
until the late1970s,  and the next episode did not occur until  1982. In 
addition, because capacity is usually measured as the ability to produce 
raw steel, estimates of capacity reductions may be somewhat overstated. 
The introduction of  continuous casters has increased the yield from raw 
steel by 10 to 15 percent. 
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Closing Decision 
The neoclassical prediction for a competitive 
industry facing an inward-shifting demand curve 
is that high-cost plants will exit, leaving the 
lowest-cost plants to produce in the long run. 
However, as long as variable costs are covered, a 
firm will continue to operate an exiting plant 
that has fixed costs, since doing so minimizes 
the firm's losses.7  During this period the firm 
will not make any major reinvestments; instead, 
it will disinvest from the capital in place. 
Because most production processes do 
involve fixed costs, the decision to close a plant 
usually will involve a period of operation and 
disinvestment before shutdown. The optimal 
closing point will not occur until the net reve- 
nue, which is the return to continued operation 
of the capital in place, equals the return that 
could be earned on the salvage value. Thus, the 
speed with which a firm closes a plant depends 
on how quickly net revenues decline and on the 
amount of capital that can be salvaged once the 
plant is shut down. 
Clearly, one important factor that will affect 
the timing of plant closings is the general level of 
economic activity When sales decline during 
recessions, they increase the probability of plant 
closings by reducing net revenues. This is 
especially true for a cyclical industry like steel. 
Other factors are also important, however. 
Since the firm will not replace the aging capital 
with new equipment, one determinant of a 
plant's net revenues is the amount of  mainte- 
nance the capital in place requires in order to 
operate (in other words, its durability).  The firm 
will continue to bear maintenance expenditures 
as long as the capital generates enough revenue 
to cover both the additional expense and other 
variable costs. Obviously, the larger the mainte- 
nance expenditures, the more they reduce net 
revenues, and the less likely they will be worth 
making.8 
A low salvage value may also delay a plant's 
closing. The salvage value is the net amount of 
money the firm will realize when the plant 
closes. A large positive value means that much of 
the capital can be extracted without loss from 
the plant, thus shortening the time to shut- 
down. A negative value extends the time before 
exit, causing the plant to be operated even 
though total variable costs are not covered. In 
this situation, the firm would actually borrow to 
pay the uncovered variable costs in order to 
avoid the greater loss of closing.9 
In general, the salvage value is determined by 
a plant's resale value minus costs incurred dur- 
ing closing. The resale value of the capital 
depends on its specificity to the production 
process and on output growth in the industry 
The closing costs include the resources neces- 
sary to gather the information to make the 
closing decision and the time spent planning 
and executing it. The firm may also face em- 
ployee-related closing expenses, such as sever- 
ance pay, early retirement pay, and pensions, 
depending on previous contractual agreements 
or on local plant-closing legislation. Increases in 
these costs, by raising closing costs, will delay 
shutdowns.I0 
Thus, in a contracting industry with durable 
and specific capital and high closing costs, firms 
will delay closing plants. The plants exit even- 
tually, but only after a long period of disinvest- 
ment. The result of selective and drawn-out 
disinvestment is a gradual increase in the average 
age of  the industry's capital stock and a slowing 
of  productivity growth. 
Two things are vital to remember, however. 
First, in an industry with high exit barriers, a 
slow decline is the optimal rate of closure, 
despite years of  poor earnings by the industry 
Resources are always being utilized in their 
highest return activity during a contraction. 
Second, although an industry may appear to be 
failing because of lack of reinvestment, the 
antiquated plants are the result of exit barriers' 
prolonging exit and are not the cause of the 
industry's decline. While some plants will be 
modernized, those that are exiting will receive 
little investment. 
In sum, an important consequence of allow- 
ing the market to reallocate resources from an 
industry with high exit barriers is that capacity 
will contract slowly, with old capacity lingering 
on and plants closing in bunches during down- 
turns that lower revenues. 
9 The cost of going bankrupt, instead of  continuing to pay uncovered 
variable costs, would be an upward bound on the amount the firm 
would be willing to borrow in this situation. 
10  This conclusion depends on the simplifying assumption made 
7 In this context, fixed costs refer to costs that must be paid whether  here that closing costs do not increase over time. As pointed out by 
the plant is open or closed.  Littman and Lee (1983) if employee.related closing costs rise quickly with 
the seniority of the work force, then a firm might accelerate closing to 
8 See Lamfalussy (1961) for a discussion of these issues.  avoid the greater future liability. 
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Barriers in the Steel 
Industry 
Clearly, the magnitude of exit barriers in an 
industry depends on three factors: how long 
gross revenues are expected to cover variable 
costs, how specific and durable the capital is, 
and how high closing costs are."  This section 
presents some information about these factors in 
the steel industry which suggests that exit bar- 
riers are large. 
1976  1986  -- 
Total Variable Cost of Raw Steel  $217.00  $206.00 
Materials, Energy and Labor 
(per net ton) 
Total Variable Cost of Finished Steel  3  10.28  348.00 
Materials, Energy, and Labor 
(per net ton of finished product) 
Total Cost of Finished Steel  361.38"  449.00 
(per net ton of finished product) 
a. The number cited here is slightly lower than the figure reported by 
the Council on Wage and Price Stability, but is calculated as they 
describe in the text. 
SOURCES: U.S. Council on Wage and Price Stability (1977), p. 60; 
Wharton Econometrics (1987), p. 4.5. 
A rough idea of the likelihood that gross 
revenues will cover variable costs-the costs 
of all variable inputs to production-can be 
obtained by comparing the average variable cost 
of a ton of steel to the prices of various steel 
products. This cost is conventionally measured 
as the sum of labor, energy, and materials. The 
U.S. Council on Wage and Price Stability cal- 
culated that the average total variable cost per 
net finished ton of steel in 1976 was $310.28. 
Wharton Econometrics estimated that this cost 
equaled $348.00 in 1986. These estimates 
include the cost of producing raw steel, as well 
as the-average industry cost of finishing it. Both 
of these studies also include estimates of  the 
financing costs of steel production, taken here 
to be the average fixed cost of production (see 
table 1). 
Table 2 compares estimates of average vari- 
able cost and average total cost for selected steel 
products to the average realized price per net 
ton of those products in 1976 and in 1986. In 
most cases, product prices were above the 
average variable cost. On the other hand, almost 
all of  these prices were well below the total cost 
of finished steel. (Product prices do vary 
cyclically, causing the size of this shortfall to 
change over time. See table 3.)  Overall, the data 
indicate that product prices may fall consider- 
ably below the average total cost without making 
immediate shutdown a firm's loss-minimizing 
alternative. 
How long does a plant that is not covering 
total cost continue to operate?  As  stated above, 
unless prices dip or variable costs rise unexpect- 
edly, a plant's closing would depend on the 
durability of its capital, on its resale value, and 
on the amount of closing costs. 
Of  these three, the high cost of closing 
appears to be the most important exit barrier 
currently in the steel industry When closing a 
plant, a firm records a charge for the costs of 
dismantling the mill, for the operating loss until 
closing, for losses involved with contract termi- 
nations, and for a write-down of  the assets. It 
also records the estimated liability for current 
and future payments to employees for pensions 
and insurance benefits. 
The payments due to the work force when an 
integrated steel plant closes are substantial. For 
instance, by the provisions of a typical labor 
contract, qualified union members on layoff 
because of a permanent closing are eligible for 
severance pay, supplemental unemployment 
benefits, pension payments and, in some cases, 
supplemental pension payments.12 Severance 
pay for union members with at least three years 
of seniority equals four to eight weeks' wages, 
depending on their years of service. A firm 
continues to pay life- and medical-insurance 
premiums for six to 12 months for workers with 
at least two years of continuous service. Workers 
may also be entitled to supplemental unemploy- 
ment payments for up to two years. 
One of  the largest parts of  the employee- 
related closing costs is the estimated liability for 
future pension payments. Of  course, the portion 
of closing costs represented by the pension 
liability is not caused by closing, since the firm 
11  See Caves and Porter (1976) and Porter (1976) for an exhaustive 
list of various possible exit barriers. The types of barriers discussed here  W  12 The contract described here became effective in 1980. Terms of 
are those that seem particularly pertinent to the steel industry.  contracts made in later years appear to be quite similar. 
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stays open. Nor are all of these charges out-of- 
pocket expenses. But they do represent pay- 
ments that the firm must fund from some new 
source, since the cash flow from the plant will 
cease. This places an increased burden on a 
firm's remaining mills.'5 
Average  Average  Average 
Variable  Realized  Total 
Cost  Price  Cost 
Hot-Rolled Sheets  $282.30  $229.43  $333.40 
Cold-Rolled Sheets  328.94  288.43  380.04 
Hot-Dipped, Galvanized 
Sheets and Strip  356.92  368.59  408.02 
Hot-Rolled Bars  286.96  31 1.14  338.06 
Structurals  272.97  358.94  324.07 
1986 
Average  Average  Average 
Variable  Realized  Total 
Cost  Price  Cost 
Hot-Rolled Sheets  $305.00  $273.04  $406.00 
Cold-Rolled Sheets  376.00  418.21  477.00 
Hot-Dipped, Galvanized 
Sheets and Strip  419.00  537.93  520.00 
Hot-Rolled Bars  313.00  360.03  414.00 
Structurals  291.00  321.57  392.00 
Note: The cost data from table 1 were adjusted for variation in finishing 
costs among products using data from Wharton Econometrics (1987), 
p. 4.7. Estimates are industry averages; costs are bound to be higher in 
exiting plants. 
SOURCE: Bureau of the Census, Current Industrial Reports: SteelMill 
Products, various issues. 
In addition, because of the terms of pension 
agreements in this industry, the pension pay- 
ments are actually higher if  workers retire from a 
closing plant rather than from an operating mill. 
Under normal circumstances, union members 
are eligible for pensions after 30 years of service, 
or at age 65 (with 10  years of service),  or at age 
60 (with 15 years of service). But for workers 
13  The problem is similar to that of Social Security when future 
generations are smaller. While in 1977 there were 2.3  workers for each 
retiree, currently there are two retirees for every steelworker. 
laid off by plant closings, the eligibility require- 
ments are eased. For instance, workers over 55, 
whose age plus years of service equal at least 70, 
become eligible. Also, some workers receive 
supplemental pension payments of  $400 per 
month until they reach age 62,  if they are laid off 
by a shutdown. 
By  the terms of this typical labor contract, it 
is clear that the size of  the payments depends 
crucially on the age of workers and on their 
years of service. A  firm might be able to reduce 
the work force somewhat by attrition before 
closing a plant, but under a seniority system, the 
remaining workers would tend to be older, with 
more years of service, which would drive up 
closing costs.'* 
These claims raise the cost of closing steel 
facilities enormously In 1979, the United States 
Steel Corporation shut down a variety of mills 
and parts of  mills, laying off more than 11,000 
workers. According to the company's annual 
reports, the total cost of  the closings was 
approximately $650 million, of which about 
$415 million represented labor-related expenses, 
implying a cost per worker of  more than 
$37,000.  Bethlehem Steel reported similar fig- 
ures in its annual report, recording a $700 
million liability in 1982 when about 18,000 
workers were laid off during a restructuring that 
dealt principally with steel facilities. 
More recent estimates show that these costs 
may be higher. One study indicates that the total 
cost per employee of closing a mill is $75,000,  of 
which $54,000 represents  employee-related 
closing costs (Wharton Econometrics [1987]). 
Using these figures, the Bethlehem Steel restruc- 
turing would currently cost $1.35 billion. 
Firms cannot depend on high resale values to 
cover the large closing costs. The capital is quite 
specific to the industry and is of little value for 
any purpose other than steelmaking. Nor are 
other steel firms particularly interested in buy- 
ing these plants; most integrated firms are 
reducing their capacity, and minimills are build- 
ing new plants. Furthermore, the equipment in a 
closed plant is usually in need of major invest- 
ment, since the former owner has disinvested 
from it before closing.'5 
14 It is difficult to evaluate how these employee-related  costs 
change over time. The severance payment formula does not appear 
highly sensitive to the seniority profile of the plant: the maximum  sever- 
ance payment is earned by workers with 10 years of experience. The 
supplemental pension payment is more complicated. The liability would 
increase if the number of qualifying workers rose over time (workers 
qualify if their combined age and years of service is over a certain 
minimum), and would fall if the number of qualifying workers fell over 
time (workers receive the payment only until age 62). 
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Hot-Rolled  Cold-Rolled  Galvanized  Hot-Rolled 
Year  Sheets  Sheets  Sheets & Strip  Bars  - 
1976  $229.43  $288.43  $368.59  $311.14 
1977  254.15  320.51  392.72  337.23 
1978  281.10  354.31  430.35  364.26 
1979  314.87  388.78  468.76  403.38 
1980  317.30  395.42  487.64  415.90 
1981  350.12  436.77  532.31  445.83 
1982  338.79  433.87  525.84  414.94 
1983  325.53  437.93  525.87  387.38 
1984  326.01  453.18  560.16  393.49 
1985  310.35  437.97  536.75  366.89 
1986  273.04  418.21  537.93  360.03 
SOURCE: Bureau of the Census, Current Industrial Reports: Steel Mill Products, various issues.  - 
During the industry's contraction, there have 
been few examples of closing plants sold for 
continued operation as integrated steel mills. 
(One notable exception is the plant in Weirton, 
West Virginia. The employees purchased this 
mill from National Steel and have continued 
integrated production.) When sales do take 
place, the purchasers are generally interested in 
the rolling and finishing facilities, and keep steel 
furnaces closed. For instance, California Steel 
now imports semifinished steel for finishing at a 
(formerly integrated)  plant in Fontana, which it 
purchased from Kaiser Steel.I6 
There are few opportunities to sell individual 
pieces of equipment. One company reportedly 
auctioned off some equipment when it went 
bankrupt, and some used equipment has been 
sold abroad, but no steelmaking operations have 
been sold for movement. Inventories of raw 
materials and parts can be distributed to other 
plants, but beyond that, the equipment is likely 
to sit until the price of steel scrap rises enough 
to pay the junk dealer for dismantling it. 
1  15  From 1960 to 1981, the average annual investment per ton of 
capacity in major pieces of steelmaking equipment was $34.08 in plants 
whose closing was announced before 1984, compared with $128.27 for 
plants remaining open (Deily [1988]). See Deily also for evidence that steel 
firms channeled investment away from plants that were least able to 
compete with imports and minimills, particularly during the period 
1971-1981. 
1  16  See Wharton Econometrics (1987) p. 1.8, and J.  Ernest Beazley, 
"Big Steel's Push to Extend Import Quotas Draws Debate," Wallstreet 
Journal, December 30,1987. 
Structurals 
The last exit barrier, the durability of steel 
industry capital, also works to delay plant clos- 
ings by allowing the continued operation of 
aging equipment without major reinvestment. 
Furnaces and mills are depreciated over 15  to 20 
years, but may operate for longer. For example, 
table 4 indicates that the average ages of various 
pieces of capital were more than 10  years in 
1979, and that a significant percentage of the 
equipment had been operated for more than 
20 years. 
Of  course, operation of the equipment still 
involves noncapitalized maintenance and repair 
expenditures. In addition, the blast furnaces, 
which provide the flow of hot metal to the steel 
furnaces in an integrated plant, require periodic 
relining. Blast furnaces basically operate on a 
continual basis for two to eight years, depending 
on their rate of utilization. But eventually the 
refractory material that prevents the hot metal 
from destroying the furnace must be replaced. 
Figures cited for a somewhat short-term repair 
process, called gunning, range from $14 million 
to $18 million. Actual replacement of refractories 
may cost anywhere from $20 million to $100 
million, depending on the extent of the replace- 
menr and furnace rebuilding, though on average 
the cost will probably fall into the $20 million to 
$50 million range. 
Frequently, firms will postpone a reline and 
leave the blast furnace idle, provided they have 
another operating furnace. But there are some 
limits to their ability to escape both operating 
losses and closing costs by idling entire plants. 
For instance, after being laid off for two years 
because of idled equipment, workers eligible for 
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are eligible for supplemental unemployment 
benefits for up to two years. 
In sum, integrated steel firms appear to face 
sizable exit barriers. High closing costs, consist- 
ing principally of payments to employees, cur- 
rently appear to be the largest barrier. Durable 
capital and low resale values also work to delay 
plant closings. 
Average Age 
of  Capacity 
(years) 
Capacity Over 20 
Years Old 
(percent) 
Coke Ovens  17.3 
Basic Oxygen Furnaces  11.0 
Electric Furnaces  14.3 
Hot Strip Mills  19.0 
Aggregateb  17.5 
b. Includes data on  open hearth furnaces, plate mills, wire rod mills, 
cold strip mills, and galvanizing lines. 
SOURCES: American Iron and Steel Institute (1980), p. 21. Based on data 
from The World Steel Industry Data Handbook, vol. I, and the 
American Iron and Steel Institute. 
IV.  Implications for 
Public Policy 
The data presented here suggest that the decline 
of the steel industry has been painful and pro- 
longed because of large closing costs and high 
exit barriers created by the technology of  the 
production process. Although these barriers 
have delayed closings, resulting in lower profits 
and antiquated capital stocks in some plants, the 
necessary reduction of U.S. integrated  steel 
capacity has been taking place, albeit slowly 
Is there any need for policies aimed at raising 
or lowering exit barriers?  Although different 
firms, workers, stockholders, and communities 
could gain or lose, it is not at all clear that the 
economy as a whole benefits from either hasten- 
ing or delaying plant closings. However, public 
policy in at least two areas of recent concern 
may have a strong impact on the steel industry's 
exit barriers. 
First, the pension-insurance program affects 
exit barriers in the steel industry by altering the 
cost of closing plants. The Pension Benefit Guar- 
anty Corporation (PBGC), a federally chartered 
agency that insures all workers with defined- 
benefit pensions, has already assumed some of 
the industry's plant closing costs and may ulti- 
mately assume more. As  stated previously, pen- 
sion liabilities are a major part of the cost of 
closing. A firm that desires to close plants, but 
that cannot afford to do so, may find that 
declaring bankruptcy is the cheapest way to 
reduce capacity, because the PBGC becomes 
responsible for the firm's pension liabilities." 
Thus, at least potentially, the PBGC could end 
up paying the pension liability portion of some 
firms' closing costs, thereby speeding up plant 
closings by lowering this particular exit barrier.18 
The situation has become more uncertain, how- 
ever, because of the recent and still-unresolved 
differences between the PBGC and LTV Steel 
over responsibility for the latter's pension lia- 
bilities. Since this uncertainty makes it more 
difficult for firms to evaluate plant-closing  deci- 
sions, it is important for policymakers to clarify 
who will ultimately pay these liabilities. 
Policies to protect the industry from imports, 
on the other hand, may raise the exit barriers 
that steel firms face. The industry is currently 
protected by five-year Voluntary Restraint Agree- 
ments that the Reagan administration has negoti- 
ated with a number of steel-exporting  countries. 
In the short run, the effect of  the quotas may be 
to delay plant closings if the protection causes 
the industry to upwardly revise the expected 
revenues of its plants. 
The long-run effects of  the legislation are less 
clear. Firms are unlikely to reverse their long-run 
disinvestment from marginal plants unless they 
are convinced that the profitability of  these 
plants has increased permanently Such an 
assurance would require at least that the govern- 
ment make a long-term commitment to trade 
protection for the industry But such a commit- 
ment would be expensive for domestic indus- 
tries that use steel, and would by no means rule 
out further capacity reductions,  since the mini- 
mill sector will continue to grow 
17  See Buynak (1987) for a description  of the limits on the amount of 
the firm's assets that the PBGC can claim to cover unfunded pension 
liabilities. 
18  Indeed, since the maximum payment the PBGC makes to 
workers may be well below workers' contracted  pensions, and since 
supplemental payments for early retirement are not covered, the total 




Best available copyWhat public policy should not be doing is 
forcing reinvestment in the steel industry The 
most misguided aspect of the trade protection 
currently in place is its requirement that the 
industry reinvest its net cash flow from steel 
businesses back into steel plants (Steel Import 
Stabilization Act of  1984,19  U.S.C. 2253). The 
result of this directive may be to force invest- 
ment in plants that will never yield an adequate 
return, a circumstance that will increase plant 
owners' losses when the plants are eventually 
closed. 
Lack of reinvestment is not the underlying 
problem of the steel industry Although invest- 
ment in the plants that will survive is essential to 
their competitiveness,  it is clear that additional 
capacity will eventually close. But shutdowns 
will be delayed as long as steel firms find that 
exit barriers make continued operation of mar- 
ginal plants less costly than closing. 
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